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Abstract 
 
Migration flows can be sensitive indicators of the geography of economic opportunity 
and vitality.  In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) assumptions are too often made about the 
scale and direction of migration flows between rural and urban areas and about the 
ubiquity of rapid urbanisation across the region. This can divert attention from the 
economic realities of the developmental landscape in individual countries and from the 
increasing differentiation between them. This paper will demonstrate, using census data 
and other sources, that the rate at which urbanisation levels have recently been 
increasing in many large mainland SSA countries where the majority of SSA people live 
has significantly reduced, although some continue to urbanise very rapidly.  It will also 
show that SSA is not, as is often asserted, the world’s fastest urbanising region: many 
Asian countries (according to UN Habitat data) are urbanising faster. A key reason why 
SSA urbanisation levels in some countries are rising more slowly is changes in the net 
rate of in-migration to urban areas in many countries, often because of rising rates of 
circular migration related to weak urban economies.  This paper will discuss the reasons 
why misleading ideas about SSA urbanisation remain common and reflect upon the 
need to study in greater depth the ways in which the region’s current natural-resource 
based GDP growth feeds through into urbanisation and migration flows. 
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1: Background to this paper 
 
In recent years two main positions have been adopted in regard to the interrelated 
dynamics of African urban populations, rural-urban migration and urban economies.  
These have been reviewed in a recent article in World Development (Potts 2012b) and 
are therefore only briefly sketched here. The first is positive: rapid urban growth, fuelled 
by in-migration is assumed to be associated with agglomeration economies, innovation 
etc.  The second position is that urbanisation fuelled by rural-urban migration in Sub-
Saharan Africa is a puzzle, as in the 1980s and 1990s and early 2000s it was generally not 
backed by urban-based investment, job creation or much formal enterprise growth.1 
Both positions tend to take the basic assumption that rapid urbanisation – an increase in 
the urban share of the national population – is occurring across sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), in every country and every region. 
 
However, data from a variety of sources, including censuses, remote sensing of 
nucleated settlements by Africapolis, and a myriad of surveys on individual towns and 
rural areas across SSA, suggests that the picture has become more complicated.  There 
is an important chronology in the region’s urbanisation, relating to broad economic 
policy directions and the impacts of post-1980 globalisation, which should be 
recognised. In the first decade or two of independence, most countries did experience 
rapid in-migration and urbanisation, as modernisation policies encouraged this.  
However, the post-1980 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), driven by the 
resurgence of liberalism in global economic institutions, transformed the underlying 
income gaps between rural and urban areas in SSA that had driven net rural-urban 
migration. In some cases, when comparing the types of incomes likely for an urban in-
migrant with the real incomes of some rural areas in the same country over this latter 
period, the two reversed.2 That is to say, income levels were higher in the rural areas 
under study than the incomes available for those who had migrated to the town.   
Urban economies weakened sharply, de-industrialisation was common, many formal 
jobs were lost, real urban incomes dropped severely (sometimes by as much as 90 per 
cent (Potts 1997) and African cities, which already had large informal sectors, 
informalised to startling degrees. The problem was that SSA urban economies found it 
very hard to compete on the global stage for investment in urban-located productive 
enterprises that could generate large numbers of formal sector jobs paying steady 
incomes.  SSA countries lacked the following: adequate and efficient infrastructure (e.g. 
in energy); the capacity to invest strategically in urban employment-creating sectors in 
ways that did not directly flout the strictures of the World Trade Organization; and large 
educated labour forces. By contrast, the new international division of labour fostered by 
                                                 
1 Although Fay and Opal (2000) argued that the disconnect between African urban economic and urban population 
growth in the late twentieth century was explicable, theirs was a less common view and, as with the two main 
positions, drew on flawed population data. 
2 Such comparisons are notoriously difficult but – factoring in the extra costs of urban living (which is highly variable 
between towns) and the food produced in addition to rural incomes – there are many studies that argue this point for 
countries across SSA in the 1980s and 1990s (Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2002; Satterthwaite 2010; Chibuye 2011). 
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neo-liberalism favoured the comparative advantages of the markets in labour and 
capital in numerous Asian countries, many of which had already managed to establish 
the basic human and institutional capital required to compete on the international stage 
for urban jobs, often in manufacturing. Furthermore, simple geography proved a 
disadvantage. Many African countries are landlocked, which creates a significant 
competitive disadvantage in any activity involving trade, while as the centre of global 
economic gravity shifted towards Asia, the fact of proximity enhanced the 
competitiveness of third countries within that region for any outsourcing of the cheaper 
end of supply chain activities. 
 
According to migration theory, the changes in the 1980s and 1990s would have reduced 
rural-urban migration and thus slowed urbanisation. However, many mainstream 
analyses of that period have instead maintained that the speed at which national 
populations were becoming more urban remained unchanged, with some even arguing 
that it was accelerating (e.g. see Tiffen 2003). But such analyses tended to be based on 
flawed data about urban population trends and rises in urbanisation levels in SSA 
countries.  In reality, the data sources mentioned earlier have recorded a slowing in the 
shift from rural to urban settlements and the consequent rise in the level of 
urbanisation in many countries – so African rural-urban migrants have turned out to be 
as logical as any others and indeed conform to theoretical expectations. 
 
The detailed evidence about these changes, drawn from surveys and censuses across 
Africa, can be found in Potts (2010).  A key point is that growth rates of urban 
populations (which should not be confused with urbanisation) in SSA have generally 
been fuelled by high natural increase rates for decades.  These were often nearly as high 
as rural natural increase rates, but could not lead to urbanisation – meaning a rise in the 
proportion of people living in towns – since this only occurs if urban growth exceeds the 
national population growth rate. For Africa as a whole, it has been estimated that the 
contribution of net in-migration to urban growth was about 40 per cent in the 1960s 
and 1970s, but fell to only 25 per cent in the 1980s. Net rural out-migration rates in 
Africa were also reported to have fallen from 1.07 per thousand in the 1960s to 0.5 in 
the 1980s (Chen et al. 1998, 2004).3 Once this is recognised, it becomes much easier to 
understand that a lowering in the propensity to migrate to town, and also in the 
likelihood for in-migrants to stay there for long periods of time, can have quite marked 
impacts on the rate at which populations become more urban.  
 
As noted, authoritative reviews comparing African urbanisation with other global 
regions have acknowledged the changes in the role and scale of migration, even before 
recent censuses provided more data for investigation in SSA.  But these analyses have 
been insufficiently recognised. In part, this may be because a shift in focus has taken 
place in migration studies in SSA over the past two decades, away from internal 
                                                 
3 The calculations for net rural out-migration are based on censuses from 17 African countries, including 5 from North 
Africa, but the coverage of the time period is incomplete; specific rates have to be treated with some caution, 
therefore, even if the direction of change can be regarded with greater confidence. 
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migration within countries. Most funding and scholarship has shifted to the study of 
international migration between African countries, and emigration out of SSA. This is 
probably because this type of migration draws the attention of the destination countries 
and the funding bodies located there. Thus, in the UK there has been great interest in 
research on the African (and other) ‘diasporas’, partly with a view to assess their role in 
‘development’ in their countries of origin (see, for example, the discussion in Mercer et 
al. 2009). There is also much work funded in the EU, and in other destination countries, 
particularly South Africa, on so-called ‘illegal’ immigrants, although often the real issue 
being investigated is local debates and politics about immigrants more broadly.  The 
human rights issues of the (sometimes terrible) conditions and fates of some migrants 
when travelling and trying to find work in the EU also attracts much academic and policy 
interest.  Part of this is the understandable scholarly and political concern with the roots 
and outcomes of xenophobia (e.g. Mcdonald et al. 1998; Landau et al. 2005; Mosselson 
2010).  Nonetheless, internal migration flows in most SSA countries far exceed 
international movements and thus continue to require research – usually rural-rural 
movements are the largest (and in terms of studies) (Bilsborrow 1998; Lucas 2007), but 
rural-urban movements remain significant.  
 
The migration flow that has been least studied recently, however, is urban-rural 
migration. There is much evidence that in many countries, and for many towns, this type 
of migration increased, as urban economies faltered and declined in the last decades of 
the twentieth century in SSA. SSA countries have a long history of strong economic and 
social links between rural and urban areas. The nature and reasons for these links, or at 
least their relative strength, differed between countries due to specific economic and 
political histories and cultural norms. It is possible to discern differences between West 
Africa and southern Africa in particular, both in terms of the empirical patterns and the 
scholarly traditions of study about these patterns (see Potts 2010 for a detailed 
discussion; see also Ferguson 1999 regarding southern African traditions; for an early 
and insightful review see Epstein 1967). In a very general sense, southern African 
scholarship historically tended to focus on the negative structural conditions imposed by 
colonialism, in particular white settler states, which institutionalised patterns of circular 
migration and enforced the maintenance of rural-urban links. West African scholarship, 
however, was more likely to treat circular migration and rural-urban links as prosaic 
norms reflecting political and cultural regional traditions – which were not always 
constructed in terms of the impact of colonialism or capitalism – as well as economic 
factors. East African scholarship on these phenomena fell somewhere between the 
other two regional approaches, with quite a strong tendency to theorise them in neo-
classical economic terms (e.g. see Elkan 1967, 1985).  There was a great deal of overlap 
between these broad regional approaches and focuses. However, the southern African 
tradition often viewed circular migration in negative terms due to its enforced nature in 
that region for so many generations.  As scholarship in the social sciences has moved 
away from the old metanarratives which underpinned these differences, more recent 
studies are less differentiated, although a tendency to view circular migration as 
outdated and problematic remains in some South African studies. 
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2: Circular migration and urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
As noted, African urban areas are characterised by extreme levels of informality, in 
economic activities as well as in the production and consumption of many essential 
services such as housing and water. Most urban residents tend to be poor, and many 
are very poor and struggle to cover their daily basic needs. In current livelihood terms, 
most urban livelihoods are vulnerable and lack resilience. In the global North urban 
livelihoods were similarly vulnerable for the majority in the historical past, as people 
were divorced from the means of production and reliant on selling their labour to 
employers or self-employment in petty trade or services. Just as in SSA cities today, in 
the absence of comprehensive welfare nets, earning an income was a necessity no 
matter the conditions. The alternative was to starve and many did. However, not only 
were formal sector jobs in towns being created at rapid rates in Europe and North 
America, a combination of pressures from above and below also transformed these 
conditions as the elements of the welfare state (pensions, unemployment benefits, 
social grants etc.) were gradually established (e.g. Green 2010). This way, the cruder 
aspects of vulnerability inherent for workers under capitalism were removed whilst 
working conditions and wages improved. The provision of social housing (largely by 
philanthropy in its early stages) was another fundamental aspect of such livelihood 
improvements. Hence, the need for absolutely desperate livelihood measures in the 
towns in order to remain fed and sheltered in the event of an economic slump was 
reduced. 
 
In sub-Saharan African cities, as yet, the fundamental aspects of livelihood vulnerability 
for most residents remain. With few exceptions (notably South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia and, to an extent, Senegal)4 (Ellis et al. 2009), welfare nets are 
minimal and have no structural impact.  Just as in the European and North American 
cities of the past, urban dwellers must cultivate economic and social networks to hedge 
against the inherent risks of their existence; this is true both for those born in the city 
and migrants, most of whom come from rural areas within the country (i.e. are not 
immigrants).  Charity and churches play a significant role, just as they did in urban 
welfare in Europe and North America.  In-migrants who are less established (partly 
because they tend to be youthful), less locally connected, and perhaps less skilled or 
educated, may be the most vulnerable to working in particularly low paid sectors. Such 
jobs may pay too little to support a household, and only ‘single’ migrants renting and 
perhaps sharing one room, or dependents living within, and partly supported by, a 
larger household, may be able to ‘afford’ to work in such jobs.  If economic conditions 
worsen and real incomes fall in other sectors, then families may have to disperse to 
similar conditions, because they cannot afford to live as a family unit.  This is a very 
familiar picture for scholars of African urbanisation, since much of colonial urban 
employment, pay and housing policy was predicated on a ‘preference’ for ‘single’ 
                                                 
4 These are the only countries so far to have introduced universal pensions for old people.  Cash transfers and other 
grant systems are gaining some ground in rural areas in Africa.  
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workers whose families often had to remain in rural areas as there was neither the 
space nor the money for them to live in towns.  Aspects of these income, employment 
and household composition issues, and their interaction with migrancy, can be observed 
in cities across the world, including in developed countries, and they remain 
fundamental determinants of livelihood patterns in sub-Saharan African towns. 
 
One outcome of livelihood vulnerability has been an increased propensity for mobility, 
not just into towns, but out of them as well.  Researching and establishing trends in 
circular migration into and out of towns is tricky. Here circular migration is defined as 
migration into a town and then, at some point, which could be a year or even decades 
later, movement out of the town. In contemporary SSA this usually means return to the 
rural area of origin but it is not uncommon for migrants to move to another rural area, 
which is why it helps not to talk about ‘return’ migration in this context. Containing 
migration data in census reports may help. However, short- to medium-term circular 
movements that occur within the intercensal period are not captured and thus remain 
‘hidden’. For research conducted within towns rather than rural areas, which study the 
extent of urban-rural flows, the problem is that the out-migrants involved are, by 
definition, no longer available to interview. The subjects of study can only be those in 
town, examining their views and plans.  Although there are arguments that their stated 
plans may either over- or under-estimate the propensity to leave the city in the future, 
they are a useful indication of migration patterns, particularly if it is possible to compare 
migrant cohorts’ intentions over time using the same methodology to establish a trend.  
This sort of research has been conducted in Harare, Zimbabwe, and found that there 
was a major increase in the propensity of migrants who anticipated a move out of the 
city between 1985 and 2001. In addition, their anticipated length of stay in town 
reduced over this same period (Potts 2006, 2010) (see Table 1). By 2001 only 13 per cent 
felt sure they could or would stay in town, compared to about one third in the 1980s. 
There was no doubt that these patterns were primarily caused by the economic 
problems and insecurity of urban life.  Hundreds of interviews demonstrated this: 
migrants repeatedly explained how lack of secure employment and reasonable incomes 
in relation to necessary survival costs, and the threat of destitution if income streams 
failed, for whatever reason, were the reasons they anticipated an eventual move out of 
Harare.  Some looked forward to the move, others were unhappy about it but felt it was 
unavoidable. Similar reasons for, and ambivalent feelings about, ‘return’ migration were 
evident in research on mining migrants in Zambia in the 1990s by Ferguson (1999). 
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Table 1 Migrants' future plans in Harare: 1985, 1988, 1994 and 2001 
 
Future Plans % of migrants 
1985 1988 1994 2001 
Staying permanently in 
Harare 
34 36 19 13 
Don't know**  2** 15 12 10 
Leaving after 'retirement' 18 37*  3 7 
Leaving before 'retirement': 
of which, planned length of 
stay: 
45 12* 65 31 
   <1 year 4 3 4 8 
   1-5 years 7 5 9 14 
   6-10 years 8 4 9 3 
   >10 years then leave 23 * 43 7 
   Don't know** 3** ** ** ** 
Expect to leave:  timing 
unspecified  
** ** ** 39 
 
Notes: Columns may not add precisely to 100% etc. due to rounding. 
* In the 1988 survey those planning to stay over 10 years and then leave, were coded under 'leaving after retirement'. 
This figure of 36% is therefore comparable to the combined categories of 'leaving after retirement' and 'leaving 
before retirement but staying for more than ten years' (equivalent to 41%, 46% and 14% respectively for 1985 and 
1994 and 2001). 
** In 1988, 1994 and 2001 there was only one coded category of 'don't knows' for all those not sure of their future 
plans.  In 1985 they were disaggregated between those who were not sure if they would stay or leave Harare, and 
those who knew they would leave but could not specify when.  In 2001 most of those who responded ‘don’t know’ 
went on to explain where they planned to go and how they would obtain land there so they did expect to leave but 
were just uncertain of when. 
 
In West Africa, longitudinal research by Gugler in the Nigerian town of Enugu also found 
a significantly increase, when comparing his first survey in 1961 with a follow-up survey 
in 1987, in residents claiming that they would eventually leave the town. In his view 
these patterns evidently ‘required a structural interpretation’ (Gugler 2002: 23). The 
significance of widespread retrenchments in the city in the 1970s and 1980s and the 
dwindling usefulness of any pensions were suggested as important causative factors. His 
findings fitted with his earlier assessment that ‘permanent family migration is not an 
option for many, probably most Africans, in the absence of unemployment/invalidity/ 
retirement benefits’ (Gugler 1989: 348). Such materialist considerations are far from the 
only factors involved in circular migration of this type, as rural-urban linkages in SSA are 
bound up with strong social, cultural and political issues, all of which are acknowledged 
and examined in the research discussed above. Nonetheless, the materialist 
considerations have unquestionably been dominant. 
 
Other surveys that have indicated the heightened significance of circular migration and 
of reduced in-migration to towns in many SSA countries are numerous, and are 
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reviewed in Potts (2010). In West Africa, the evidence included the results of a large-
scale migration project across the region covering 1988 to 1992 (NESMUWA – the 
Network of Surveys on Migration and Urbanization in West Africa). This survey found 
that net out-migration rates from many rural areas across francophone West Africa 
appeared to be falling, as well as a marked tendency for rural out-migrants to be moving 
to other countries, including outside Africa, thus bypassing urban settlements in their 
own countries (Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004). A recent a case study of Lubumbashi in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) summarised the livelihood predicament 
faced by so many in sub-Saharan Africa, and the impact on migration patterns, in the 
following way:   
 
Due to the precariousness of living conditions, Congolese people are constantly 
moving, both within the nation and externally, looking for opportunities to get 
by – a kind of ‘strategic nomadism…. the Lushois (the residents of Lubumbashi) 
[and] the [foreign] African migrants in Lubumbashi are generally characterised by 
a culture of mobility – they constantly move back and forth between the city and 
other locations within and outside the country (Bakewell and Jonsson 2011: 5). 
 
Further important indications of increasing circular migration, or reduced in-migration 
to towns, has come from censuses.  Although SSA censuses were sporadic from the 
1980s, a significant number were conducted in the latter years of the twentieth century 
and the first decade or so of the twenty-first century, giving us an important opportunity 
to assess trends in urban population change.  Evidently, such change is based not only 
on migration but, for individual towns (rather than the urban hierarchy as a whole 
where factors like redefinition of small rural settlements as urban complicate matters), 
it is possible to use triangulation with what is known about rural versus urban birth and 
death rates to get a general idea of the contribution of net in-migration to urban 
population growth in an intercensal period.  For large mainland countries with 
populations over about 2.5 million, in which the vast majority of sub-Saharan Africans 
live, these recent censuses have been showing that in many cases the difference 
between the growth rate of many large towns and the population of the country as a 
whole has been much smaller than has been projected by most authorities (local and 
international). Given the earlier point about how urban and rural natural increase rates 
remained quite similar until very recently (see Tables 2 and 3 for Zambia and Zimbabwe: 
note that falls in urban birth rates can be countered by lower urban death rates for 
children),5 this could only have occurred if net in-migration was smaller than 
anticipated. The main reason for the overestimation of urbanisation levels in SSA has 
been that projections tended to be based on the presumption that formerly very high 
net in-migration was continuing.  In some cases, census evidence showing the contrary 
was not factored in for long periods. 
 
                                                 
5 The 2010 Demographic and Health Survey for Tanzania records very similar crude birth rates for rural and urban 
areas too.  The rural rate was 39 and the urban rate 35 (United Republic of Tanzania 2013).   
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Table 2: Zambian demographic indices 1980, 1990 and 2000: national, rural and urban 
 
Demographic 
index 
Total Zambia Rural Urban 
 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
Crude birth 
rate 
37 44 36 36 45 40  40 43 29 
Total fertility 
rate 
7.2 6.7 6.0 7.2 7.0 6.7 7.6 6.3 4.9 
Infant mortality 
rate 
99 123 110 106 130 117 89 106 91 
 
Under-five 
mortality rate 
121 151 162 132 164 180 108 128 126 
 
Life expectancy 
at birth 
52 
 
47 50  
 
50 45 48 54 51 54  
 
Adult mortality  12.2 14.3   10   16 
 
Sources: Censuses and Demographic Health surveys 
 
 
 
Table 3: Zimbabwe demographic indices 2001-2, national, Harare, Bulawayo 
 
 Provincial population growth indices 1992-2002 
Province Population 
1992  
‘000s 
Population 
2002 
‘000s 
Crude 
birth rate 
2001-02 
Crude 
death rate 
 2001-02 
Natural 
increase 
2001-02  % 
AAGR  
1992-
2002 % 
Zimbabwe 10,412 11,632 30.3 17.2 1.3 1.1 
Harare  a 1,537 1,896 30.5 10.6 2.0 2.1 
Bulawayo  b 622 677 27.0 13.9 1.3 0.8 
 
Source: compiled or calculated from data in CSO (2004), CSO (nd.) 
1. Harare province essentially comprised three separately designated urban areas in 2002, Harare, 
Chitungwiza and Epworth, which essentially function as an urban conglomeration.  The rural population of 
the province only accounts for about 1% of the population.   
2. Bulawayo province comprises Bulawayo city; the two are synonymous 
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It is important at this point to emphasise that this must not be construed as suggesting 
that: (a) urban populations in SSA are not growing fast or (b) that there is not much 
migration at all. These false conclusions are so often drawn from the argument being 
made that it is crucial to fend them off (for example see Potts 2012a for a detailed 
refutation of these arguments/conclusions. Most towns still experience rapid population 
growth and some net in-migration, it is just that frequently neither have been as high as 
projected and most of the growth comes from natural increase. Figure 1 models various 
scenarios of how similar rates of urban population growth can be fuelled by different 
combinations of in- and out-migration and urban natural increase.  As shown, scenarios 
2B and 2C bring about annual population growth of around 3 per cent, which would 
mean the population would double in about 23 years, equivalent to the natural increase 
rate (which could be similar to that of the national population), but incorporate 
considerable migration as well. Even when annual urban growth falls below probable 
national rates, as in scenario 3, this can still incorporate considerable in-migration 
(counterbalanced by high out-migration) as in Scenarios 3B and 3C. 
 
Where data are available, it is often apparent that many migrants still move to towns 
from rural areas.  However, it is also apparent that many also leave them, and 
consequently the net rate of in-migration has fallen (see Tables 4 and 5 for Zambia and 
Zimbabwe in the 1990s). When triangulating this with surveys such as those discussed 
above, which indicate changing migration patterns due to livelihood problems in towns, 
a picture emerges revealing a significant shift in migration trends from about the 1980s 
to the early 2000s. It also indicates that many countries remain more rural than 
expected.   
 
In Zambia such shifts were so significant that during the 1980s and 1990s net migration 
for the country was urban-rural because the Copperbelt towns’ economies, in particular, 
were so weak that people were leaving them in very large numbers (Table 4). Some 
went to Lusaka, but the national migration data showed clearly that most turned to 
rural areas (Potts 2005). This included some people born in towns on the Copperbelt, 
indicating that it was not a purely circular migration issue. In Cote d’Ivoire, census 
analysis also showed that out-migration, particularly of Ivorian citizens, from towns 
(including Abidjan) caused the share of the population in settlements with more than 
5,000 residents to fall between 1988 and 1998 (Beauchemin 2002; Beauchemin and 
Bocquier 2004). This meant that both countries counter-urbanised in these time 
periods, with their populations becoming less urban. The census evidence suggests this 
was also the case in Mali during the years 1987-98 and in Central African Republic 
during 1988-2003. The comparison of urban versus national population growth in these 
countries is depicted in Figure 2. As shown, net in-migration to capital cities tended to 
continue, although much less strongly than in the 1960s and 1970s, and the net out-
migration tended to occur in towns further down the urban hierarchy. Obviously each 
country has its own specific variations with some towns growing faster than others, but 
the overall point remains: taken together, town populations grew more slowly than the 
national population. 
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Table 4: Net in-migration indices by province, Zambia, 1990-2000  
 
Province/Area Mid-point popn.  
1990-2000 ('000s) 
Net migrants 
('000s) 
Net migration 
rate (per'000)  
Rural Zambia 5,168 +144.3 +2.8 
Urban Zambia 3,114 -146.1 -4.7 
Predominantly urban 
provinces: 
   
  Copperbelt 1,501 -206.0 -137 
  Lusaka 1,170 +70.1 +59 
  Central 853 +24.9 +29 
  Southern  1,047 -26.2 -25 
Predominantly rural 
provinces: 
   
  Eastern 1,120 -2.1 -2 
  Luapula 637 +41.8 +66 
  Northern 1,035 +64.1 +62 
  Northwestern 474 +39.4 +83 
  Western 680 -7.1 -10 
 
Source: CSO (2003) Note: Rural and urban net migrants and rates have been calculated from raw data as the totals in 
the report tables are errors. 
 
Table 5: Net in-migration indices for Zimbabwe’s main towns, 1990s 
 
Inter-censal Migration in main towns  
Province 2002 census 
population 
>10 yrs a 
In-migrants  
1992-2002/ 
census popn  
in 2002 
      % 
As % of population aged >10 years in 1992 
Resident 
in 1992 
and 2002 
In-migrants 
 1992-2002 
Out-migrants 
  1992-2002 
Net gain 
1992-2002 
migration b 
Harare 1,397,596 34 75 38 -25 13 
Bulawayo 514,524 30 75 32 -25 6 
 
Source: calculated from data in 2002 census table 3.3a, CSO (2004).  
Notes: a. to compare populations in 1992 and 2002 the census tables exclude those under ten years of age in 2002 as 
they had not been born in 1992; to retain comparability the matrices used to generate inter-censal flows also exclude 
the under-tens in 1992.  The CSO also excluded from the 2002 population those who reported that their place of 
enumeration had not been their main place of usual residence during the 12 months before that census. 
b. Population resident in 2002 minus the 1992 residents still there in 2002 (= inter-censal in-migration), minus difference 
between 1992 resident population and the 1992 residents still there in 2002 (= inter-censal out-migration).   
c. Percentages may not add exactly due to rounding 
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Ten other censuses, from Mozambique, Malawi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Senegal, 
Mauritania, Niger, Togo and Benin, have shown that urban growth rates have not been 
sufficiently in excess of national population growth for rapid ‘urbanisation’ – the rise in 
the level of urbanisation – to have occurred (Figure 3). Again, there is much variation 
between countries in terms of which towns in the urban hierarchy have experienced 
growth at around or below the national rate. Capital cities have not always been the 
fastest growing.  Each country’s experience requires detailed analysis, which cannot be 
provided here, and the same factors are not always at play to the same extent. In terms 
of the big picture of urbanisation and rural-urban migration, however, the situation for 
these nations is that the urbanised population rose by only around 1 to 2 per cent over 
their various intercensal periods (i.e. a decade or longer, sometimes much longer). Thus 
while net rural-urban migration occurred, it was not fast enough to bring about a 
dramatic shift in the rural/urban composition of the population.  In every case the 
outcome was a population significantly less urbanised than what had been projected by 
agency data, such as those produced by UN Habitat. 
 
There is reason to believe that Nigeria might be included in this second group of 
countries, which is that it has been urbanising more slowly than expected. Indeed, 
according to Africapolis data for Nigeria’s nucleated settlements, based on triangulating 
census and remotely sensed data, the whole country is far less urbanised than is 
generally stated. In the view of the scholars analysing these data, around one third of 
the population is currently urbanised, in contrast to the roughly one half stated by most 
UN sources. Attempting to analyse Nigerian census data is always very controversial, as 
the figures are highly politically charged and deeply contested, and full data sets are 
never released. However, having made such an attempt, I have shown elsewhere that it 
may be possible that the majority of large towns there have experienced slow growth 
relative to the country as a whole from the 1980s to 2006 (Potts 2012b). 
 
In strong contrast to these cases, a smaller number of countries have experienced 
precisely the very rapid urbanisation fuelled by net in-migration, as is usually argued for 
SSA, demonstrated by large cities growing much faster than the national growth rate.   
These are Cameroon, Burkina Faso and Ghana (see Figure 4). Ghana’s census is recent 
and full details of urban settlement populations have not yet been published, which 
inhibits analysis.  However it is possible to deduce from the online Final Report (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2012) the populations of some large urban areas, which indicate that 
there is much variation in the intercensal growth rates.  Accra Metropolis (as opposed to 
the urban population of the entire Greater Accra area) grew very slowly during the years 
2000-10, at about 0.1 per cent per year, compared to 3.4 per cent over the previous 
intercensal period (1984-2000), but there was much stronger urban growth beyond its 
immediate boundaries. Greater Accra region’s urban population grew from 2.6 million 
to 3.6 million at an annual rate of 3.4 per cent, compared to a national rate of 2.5 per 
cent.  Much faster urban growth, which must have included considerable net in-
migration, was recorded by other large towns. Kumasi metropolitan area was at first 
recorded as the country’s largest single town, with 2 million people, and had 
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experienced extremely rapid annual growth since 1984: 5.5 per cent from 1984 to 2000 
and 5.4 per cent from 2000 to 2010. Subsequent adjustments to the census put Accra 
Metropolis just ahead of Kumasi.  Even faster growth occurred in Ghana’s main ports, 
with Sekondi-Takoradi growing at 6.1 per cent per year from 2000 to 2010, and Tema 
(which is part of Greater Accra) at 6.7 per cent.6  The level of urbanisation shot up from 
43.8 per cent in 2000 to 50.9 per cent in 2010, an increase of 7 per cent, which is way 
above the 1 to 2 per cent increases experienced in many other countries.  Like 
Cameroon, Ghana appears to mirror the ‘received wisdom’ about SSA’s rapid 
urbanisation.  It is worth noting that in 2000 about half of Ghana’s urban population 
lived in small towns of 5,000 to 50,000 (Owusu 2012) and that a simple size threshold of 
5,000 determines urban status.  In 2000, the share of the population in towns with 
populations over about 18,000 (as listed in Ghana Statistical Services 2002, cited in 
Brinkhoff 2012) was 30.5 per cent. A significant element of the increase in urbanisation 
is likely to have been generated by redefinition of previous villages, and how ‘urban’ 
these are economically will depend on the activity and employment characteristics of 
their residents, but such data are not currently available. 
 
It was thought that Tanzania should also be categorised as part of this group given that 
Dar es Salaam has grown at around, or just under, 5 per cent annually for decades up to 
the last published census in 2002 (and all early reports of the 2012 census indicate that 
this has continued), and even more rapid growth was experienced in Arusha and 
Mwanza from 1988 to 2002. However, the lack of clarity over how many ‘urban’ 
settlements’ populations are defined and assigned is such that different sources give 
different populations, and even change their figures over time, making it very difficult to 
establish meaningful growth trends.  This is because there is no clear definition of what 
is urban in Tanzania, and recorded populations may also include, besides the main town, 
peri-urban wards, which are designated ‘urban’ and even mixed wards where much or 
part of the population is definitely rural.  Very high proportions of both of these types of 
wards can be working in agriculture, undermining their claim to be ‘urban’ in economic 
terms. There is no doubt that this has led to a general overestimation of urban 
population growth (Potts 2004; Holm 1992, 1995).  A recent study using migration data 
from the 2002 census estimates a very low contribution of net in-migration to urban 
growth during 2001-02, the year for which such data are available, of only 17 per cent 
overall, with the ‘bulk of urban growth ….. driven by natural growth and physical urban 
expansion’ via reclassification of rural populations (Muzzini and Lindeboom 2008: 49, 
emphasis added).  Yet it also establishes high rates of both in- and out-migration from 
many settlements, precisely in line with the circular migration scenarios discussed 
above.  Rural-urban and urban-rural migration flows in 2001-02 totalled about 389,000 
people, but net migration was only around 44,000 (5.3 per cent of the urban population 
compared to 0.6 per cent). In addition, about 190,000 moved between urban centres.  
In sum, Muzzini and Lindeboom (2008: 76) argue that in Tanzania, during the 1990s, 
                                                 
6 These calculations are based on combining the separately recorded populations for Sekondi and Takoradi, and Tema 
and Tema New Town, in the 2000 census, and comparing these with the published figures for Sekondi Takoradi 
Metropolis and Tema in the 2010 census. 
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‘internal migration is shaping the urban transition but its contribution to urban 
population growth is modest’, meaning that it was still playing a role in urbanisation by 
contributing to urban population growth but that that contribution had considerably 
dropped compared to the past. As a very rough rule of thumb, my own estimations for 
the contribution of net migration to urbanisation in SSA countries have compared the 
growth rate of individual towns, groups of towns or, where possible, all urban 
settlements, with the national population growth rate, assuming a rough parity in rural 
and urban natural increase rates until very recently, for reasons explained above (e.g. 
Potts 2012a; 2009). The disadvantage of this method is that, especially when including 
smaller settlements, the impact of redefinition of previously rural populations as urban 
is missed, and thus the method will still tend to overestimate net in-migration.  In the 
case of Tanzania, where the urban population enumerated in the censuses increased at 
an annual average of 4.1 per cent between 1988 and 2002 (ibid), and the national 
population at 2.9 per cent per year, this ‘rule of thumb’ method indicates net in-
migration would have constituted around 29 per cent of urban population growth.  As 
can be seen, the complexities of the Tanzanian urban definition issue, where there is 
evidently much re-classification at the lower end of the urban hierarchy, suggests that 
this would have been a significant overestimate for the 1990s and that rural-urban 
migration was contributing even far less than I estimated in my own cautious analysis.  
To complicate things even further, Muzzini and Lindeboom (2008) point out that there 
are four possible ways of calculating the urbanisation level in Tanzania in 2002, 
depending on which sorts of settlements are included.  Excluding a purely density-based 
definition, these yield urbanisation levels from only 17 per cent in 2002 if local 
government areas (LGAs) that have been gazetted with urban status are included, to the 
23 per cent derived from census data.  Given these circumstances, it is clear that it is 
very difficult to assess Tanzania’s urbanisation rates on the basis of existing data. Also, 
given that it has been ten years since full details of a census were published, the figures 
for individual urban settlements from the 2012 census will be of great interest, 
especially if the data make it possible to disaggregate more clearly between functionally 
urban populations and other areas.  
 
Similar difficulties exist when estimating urban population dynamics and in the case of 
rural-urban migration in Kenya.  Kenya has started to enumerate both ‘core’ urban areas 
and ‘peri-urban’ areas as urban. The ‘peri-urban’ areas are not, however, necessarily 
within urban administrative boundaries but are frequently rural areas with higher than 
average population densities that are ‘considered to be in a transition between rural 
and urban’ (World Bank 2011: 35). The subsequent muddle as former core urban areas 
were compared with combined core and peri-urban areas to derive growth rates and 
trends in the country’s urbanisation was anticipated when the 1999 census was made 
available: ‘any UN or World Bank publications which use these data to calculate Kenya’s 
total urban population in 1999 and its intercensal growth rate will be giving a totally 
false picture of the country’s urban dynamics in the 1990s’ (Potts 2004: 340).  For many 
‘towns’ the effect was extraordinary: in 1999, Vihiga ‘municipality’, for example, which 
had not been enumerated as urban previously, was recorded as having an urban 
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population of 109,000, a figure that was absurdly inflated.  By 2009 its ‘urban’ 
population had risen, according to the census, to only 119,000, made up of a core urban 
population of about 36,000 and a ‘peri-urban’ population of around 82,000. On the one 
hand this appears to imply that in the intervening period this ‘town’ must have 
experienced significant net out-migration, since its average annual growth rate was 
around 0.8 per cent, far below the Kenyan average of 3 per cent.  However, once it is 
recognised that this municipality mainly comprised a dense rural area (which is easily 
established by checking on Google maps), the implication may well be that the area 
experienced out-migration that might possibly have been partly rural-urban in character 
(i.e. rural people were leaving Vihiga for other, truly urban, localities).  Equally, there 
could have been out-migration of a rural-rural character driven by land shortage.  The 
implications for analyses of migration and urbanisation are evidently entirely different. 
By 2009, the proportion of Kenya’s population living in both urban and peri-urban areas 
was 30 per cent – a headline figure touted by one World Bank publication as proof of 
Kenya’s economic vigour (World Bank 2011).  Yet the ‘real’ core urbanisation level is 
much lower at 23 per cent. Therefore, and similar to Tanzania, it is not only difficult to 
know how fast Kenya is becoming urban, but the extent of the role of rural-urban 
migration in that change is also very hard to ascertain with the currently available data.  
 
These examples indicate the need for scholarly or policy analysis to develop reasonable 
definitions of what is considered ‘urban’. They also indicate that this definitional 
problem is becoming an increasingly significant issue in sub-Saharan Africa. The next 
section discusses this issue in greater detail and demonstrates why it now needs to be 
taken into account in any regional analyses of urbanisation and migration.  
 
3: The significance of urban definitions: comparative urbanism and sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
Different countries adopt different definitions to decide which settlements are counted 
as ‘urban’.  These definitions can vary significantly, which – if the differences are not 
factored in or understood – can confound comparison between countries. Most 
definitions mix a threshold size criterion with an index of urban function that is usually 
linked to the relative absence of agricultural land or employment. 
 
In urban studies there is now a strong call for a comparative urban approach (Robinson 
2006; Mcfarlane 2008; Myers 2011; Parnell and Robinson 2012). This, however, does 
not mean comparing one city or urban system with another in a simplistic way. Rather, 
it is a call for urban studies to be more global in its approach, recognising the 
significance of the experiences and attributes of urban settlements in all global regions 
(and not only the Global North) for theorising urbanisation.  It recognises the need to 
understand that similar global processes operate in urban areas across the world, to 
identify these and, subsequently, how they work their way through particular cities and 
urban systems with specific histories and roles. It also acknowledges that the 
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experiences of the cities of the developing world and emerging economies are now 
more ‘typical’ and thus need more prominence in developing contemporary 
understandings of urban economies, politics and sociology.   
 
Unquestionably, the issue of defining what is ‘urban’ is a rather prosaic one in relation 
to this call; issues of land tenure or urban governance and politics are seemingly far 
more exciting.  However, it does have an important part to play, not least because so 
many ‘big picture’ analyses of urbanisation in world regions or individual countries start 
with statements7 about the level of urbanisation and the rate of urban population 
growth with direct comparisons made with other countries or regions. These then set 
the scene for the rest of the analysis, which frequently refers back to the points 
‘established’ in the first paragraphs as touchstones for explaining why the study is of 
significance.  But what if the earlier statements are wrong?  Then, parts of the 
subsequent analysis are bound to be flawed.  This is why the comparative aspect of 
urban ‘statistics’ can be crucial. 
 
Here, the focus is on the structural economic aspects of urbanisation.  By this I mean 
taking into account the extent to which nucleated settlements have activity patterns 
which are not based on agriculture, in particular, nor forestry or small-scale fishing.  
There is an argument for assessing the developments of nucleated settlements, per se, 
or those of rural densification, both of which have significant impacts on politics, 
sociology and the possibilities for service provision.  But most broad analyses of SSA 
urbanisation today do not take these issues as their starting point.  Instead their focus is 
very much on the economics of urbanisation.  The presumption, often made explicitly 
but sometimes also implicitly, is that the population ‘designated’ as urban has moved 
away from rural activities and is working in ‘urban’ employment in secondary and 
tertiary sectors.  Much is often made of the fact that ‘urbanisation’ is associated with 
higher GDP per person, because workers in towns are employed in higher value-added 
activities associated with higher incomes, which thus is a positive economic factor (e.g. 
World Bank 2009b; McKinsey Global Institute 2010; Collier 2013).8 There is a tendency, 
therefore, to move from the statistics on urbanisation to the inference that these 
indicate structural macro-economic change in the SSA country or countries under study.  
Since it is usually argued that SSA is the world’s fastest urbanising region, then the 
                                                 
7 For example, the UN Habitat 2008 State of African Cities report included the following: ‘The 2007 overall 
urbanisation rate of the West and Central Africa region was 41.7 per cent. Seven of its 25 nations had more than half 
their population living in urban areas. …. The West African subregion is projected to have an urban majority just 
before 2020’ (UN Habitat 2008: 11).  Many of these figures were significant overestimates (see Potts 2012b). With 
reference to East Africa the same report stated, ‘The world’s shortest urban population doubling time, less than nine 
years, is found in the East Africa region, from 50.6 million in 2007 to a projected 106.7 million by 2017’ (p. 11). This 
was completely wrong. 
8 It is worth noting at this point in the argument that - quite often - the same analyses acknowledge that many, or 
even most, of the urban employment is in the informal sector, where the advantages of specialisation of labour – a 
key factor in urban economic theory – are muted since so many are self-employed, and of these the majority are 
often traders on low incomes. However, although this also has impacts on the economic characteristics of African 
cities and undermines the extent to which activities can be associated with higher value-added, it is a somewhat 
separate issue from the one under discussion in this section of the paper. 
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inference is that it is also experiencing the world’s fastest structural economic changes 
related to this urbanisation. This is highly problematic. One reason is that the 
improvements in GDP growth across SSA since about 2003, which have undoubtedly 
created economic changes, are generally associated with natural resource exploitation 
and not with urban-located employment in specialised work. A second reason is that 
these inferences are only logical if it is true that SSA is urbanising fastest, but this 
requires that we are comparing like with like. Thus, in terms of these economic analyses, 
it is crucial to consider the extent to which the urban populations enumerated in SSA 
countries are comparable to those in other regions of the world.   
 
Unfortunately, in many studies of SSA countries, functional and employment 
characteristics are not used in urban definitions, and the threshold populations are very 
small.  This means their recorded levels of urbanisation are elevated relative to other 
regions of the world.  In other words, were some of the typical aspects of urban 
definitions used in other parts of the world applied to many SSA countries, African 
countries’ urbanisation levels would often be lowered.  Since SSA is nonetheless among 
the world’s least urbanised regions when using local definitions, this means the gap 
between SSA and other parts of the world is currently larger than recognised. 
 
Analyses of how the definitional issue affects our understandings of ‘urbanisation’ in 
different countries tend to use non-African examples, presumably because of the 
decades-long difficulties of getting access to complete African census datasets, and the 
frequent lack of reliable (or any) employment data.  Nonetheless, the analyses are 
telling, as they provide insights into the astonishing reshaping of global urban geography 
which emerge when like is compared with like. Once this point is established, the 
reasons for discussing this issue in relation to African urban data become much clearer.  
Some examples (based on Corbridge and Jones 2010) are provided below. 
 
 India: depending of the proportion of settlements with between 2,000 and 
20,000 inhabitants in 2001 which is classified as urban, India’s level of 
urbanisation changes dramatically.  If most such settlements are classified as 
rural, the country would be less than 30 per cent urban.  However if most are 
categorised as urban, then India would then have been recorded as being more 
than 60 per cent urban (Satterthwaite  2004).  
 Bangladesh: if a Peruvian or Swedish definition of density to determine who is 
‘urban’ is applied to Bangladesh, most of its population becomes ‘urban’. Yet, 
the country is generally regarded as being about 80 per cent rural, with 89 per 
cent of the poor living in rural areas. 
 Latin America: adoption of an OECD definition of ‘urban’ makes the region twice 
as ‘rural’ as government definitions suggest (World Bank 2005). 
 
It is obvious from these examples that, generally, urban analyses are not comparing like 
with like and that many studies which refer to UN or World Bank data compilations to 
determine where particular countries fall in the ranks of urbanisation levels may draw 
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incorrect conclusions.  Let us examine the example of India in further detail.  The 
urbanisation level according to the census was 27.7 per cent in 2001 and 31.1 per cent 
in 2011.  It uses a much stricter definition of urbanisation than nearly all SSA countries.  
In addition to statutory towns, it only includes settlements with over 5,000 people and a 
minimum density of 400 per square kilometre where at least 75 per cent of the male 
workforce is not working in agriculture.  This last structural economic factor is crucial 
and means that one can be very confident that the urbanisation figures relate to 
functionally urban settlements. Given the analysis in the preceding section on 
Tanzania’s urban census data, there can be no doubt that if such criteria were applied to 
its settlements, its urbanisation level would fall significantly.  Or if India used Tanzania’s 
vague and non-economic definitions, it is probable that India would ‘become’ mainly 
urban; it would cross the magic 50 per cent threshold and would appear to be more 
than twice as urban as Tanzania.  Either way, the application of similar criteria provides 
a much clearer steer on the relative nature of the two countries’ economic structures.  
As it is, the data usually used to compare them would suggest that there is not much 
difference in their level of urbanisation. 
 
If we take the cases of Bangladesh and Kenya, similar points can be made about more 
realistic comparisons. Bangladesh’s urbanisation level in 2001 according to its own 
definitions (definitive data for the 2011 census are not yet available) was 23 per cent, 
roughly the same as Kenya’s 2011 core urban population level.  As described previously, 
if densely populated but not necessarily urban areas are included in Kenya’s ‘urban’ 
population, as in the 2009 census, it is 30 per cent urbanised. But if high densities were 
enough to classify areas in Bangladesh as urban, it would become considerably more 
urbanised than Kenya.  So, is Bangladesh more or less urban than Kenya?  Should 
investors anxious to cash in on new urban consumption potential be flocking to 
Bangladesh over Kenya?  Is structural economic transformation more advanced in 
Bangladesh than Kenya?  It is not easy to answer these questions based on these 
different sets of data and definitions, evidently; they do, however, show that there is a 
problem.  Triangulating with another indicator offers further guidance: the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators record that for 2005 (the last date for which data are 
available for both countries) the proportion of total employment in agriculture was 48 
per cent in Bangladesh and 61 per cent in Kenya. Even if these data are not entirely 
reliable, they do suggest, taken together with the analysis above, that Bangladesh is 
more urban and has a more diversified and modern economy, and that comparatively 
Kenya’s current urbanisation level is overstated. 
 
As with so many realms of academic study, rigorous comparative analysis of 
urbanisation can only be achieved when effort is put into ensuring that the same thing is 
being discussed: definitions matter.  In the case of urbanisation levels, the impact on 
policy issues can be enormous.  In both Bangladesh and India the sorts of redefinitions 
discussed would entirely redefine the analysis of urbanisation and migration in these 
countries, as well as the global perceptions of their character. They transform the 
geography of poverty and reclassify much migration as urban-urban rather than rural-
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urban. Given that China is now apparently mainly urban, and Latin American has been 
for decades, if Bangladesh and India with their huge populations were added to this list, 
the case for shifting development policies and aid at the global level to ‘urban’ areas 
would become overwhelming.  Migration research would immediately have to include 
more of a focus on urban-urban movements, and so on.  At the same time, the outlier 
status of still mainly rural Africa would become much more obvious and domestic and 
foreign aid policies might also alter if this was realised.   
 
This analysis is not calling for such drastic redefinitions. It is, however, calling for a 
recognition that SSA urban definitions tend to lead to comparatively generous estimates 
of urbanisation levels in many countries in the region. When combined with the point 
already established from analysis of SSA censuses – that they show that the rate at 
which such urbanisation levels have been rising is often quite slow – then the case 
becomes overwhelming for a more judicious and differentiated analysis of SSA 
urbanisation and migration, rather than a blanket assumption of very rapid real 
urbanisation across the continent.   
 
4: Is SSA the world’s fastest urbanising region? 
 
It has been explained that there has been considerable confusion over rates at which 
urbanisation levels are rising in SSA.  Figure 5 graphs data on urbanisation levels in 2001 
and 2010 downloaded from UN Habitat’s urban indicators database.  It demonstrates 
that Asian countries are generally urbanising faster. One reason why it is presumed that 
SSA is urbanising fastest is that fertility is higher in SSA, thus all population growth rates 
– national and urban – are higher than in Asia and elsewhere in the world. However, 
rises in urbanisation levels are not due to high population growth per se, but to the gap 
between urban growth and national growth, and recently this has been smaller in many 
large mainland African countries than in much of Asia. 
 
This graph also demonstrates the considerable confusion that can arise, and has arisen, 
from the use of outdated projections and misleading definitions of ‘urban’.  It appears to 
show huge falls in urbanisation in many SSA countries in the first decade of the twenty-
first century. This is evidently wrong, but the data are illustrated partly to indicate issues 
about urban data in SSA generally.  Indeed, these data show actual counter-urbanisation 
for ten SSA countries from 2001 to 2010, and only small rises for four others. The 
notable exceptions are Cameroon, Rwanda and Ghana (all of which make sense except 
that Rwanda’s surge in urban growth occurred in the 1990s rather than 2000s). The 
rather odd pattern for countries like Mauritania, Tanzania, Kenya, Senegal and Niger, 
where there is a huge difference between extremely high increases recorded for the 
1990s followed by large reductions, is due to major corrections being made in the UN 
dataset for 2010 after it was recognised that the 2001 levels had been overestimated 
due to poor projections and/or misunderstandings of the data provided by African 
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governments.9 In such cases, therefore, counter-urbanisation has not actually occurred; 
the real situation is simply that there has been quite gradual urbanisation over the past 
20 years.  However, as discussed above, the earlier poor projections have helped to 
distort understandings of SSA urbanisation and migration.10  
 
It is worth noting that there are questions raised about how much more urban some 
SSA countries will become in the foreseeable future, given their recent past trends and 
demographic changes in fertility and mortality.  One model suggests that overall SSA 
urban levels may stagnate around their current levels (estimated at lower than 40 per 
cent) with not much regional variation until 2050, in contrast to UN predictions of over 
60 per cent by that time (Bocquier and Mukandila 2011). 
 
5: Economic change and urbanisation 
 
As discussed above, the issue of the nature of economic activity in nucleated 
settlements in SSA is highly significant for any meaningful analysis of the economic (as 
opposed to purely social or political) implications of current urban trends, because many 
reports on SSA urbanisation assume, unsurprisingly, that urbanisation means a shift not 
only from rural residence but also from agricultural and strictly rural occupations. It is 
taken as a proxy for significant economic transformation and a shift to higher value-
added work and production. This is undoubtedly what has been occurring in Asian 
countries in recent decades.  
 
By contrast, some of the data available for African countries indicate that in many small 
‘urban’ settlements people are, in fact, farmers, which suggests that, in terms of 
economic structure, it would be more useful to consider these settlements as rural.  
They may not be attracting many migrants either, although this is highly variable when 
people move, often within districts, to be closer to services available in some of the 
more nucleated settlements.  However, it might be debatable whether this should be 
deemed rural-urban or rural-rural migration.  For example, somewhat astonishingly, in 
2002 one third of those employed in the urban population of Tanzania (including large 
towns) was recorded as working in agricultural activities, although this was less than in 
1988 when 45 per cent were engaged in agricultural activities. The 2002 situation 
suggests that the ‘urban’ status of certain towns was highly questionable in economic 
terms: for example, non-farm activities accounted for only 22 per cent of employment 
in the core urban areas in Kilosa, 36 per cent in Rufiji, 46 per cent in Lindi, and 52 per 
cent in Kigoma.  In peri-urban wards described as mostly ‘urban’, and thus enumerated 
as urban in most reports, the proportions tend to fall well below 50 per cent, whilst in 
                                                 
9 The strong evidence that estimated and projected figures for urban Africa are nearly always overestimated is an important reason 
for excluding Angola and the DRC from contemporary analyses until they hold censuses. 
10 For Kenya, the 34 per cent recorded in the UN Habitat database of 2001 was way above even a possible combined 
core urban and ‘peri-urban’ figure, being higher than the share enumerated in the census eight years later!  Some 
other data are simply wrong despite there being no definitional issues. For example, Zimbabwe’s censuses showed 
that its urbanisation level increased by 3 per cent from 1992 to 2002, not the 8 per cent recorded by the UN. 
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more distant peri-urban areas the proportions are so low that their inclusion as urban 
would be misleading. In small towns and townships the vast majority (67 per cent) were 
working in agriculture (Bezzini and Lindeboom 2008). In 2002, in the coastal town of 
Tanga City, which at independence was Tanzania’s second largest mainland urban area, 
the largest single employment category was made up by ‘farmers’, whilst agriculture, 
forestry and fishing together accounted for over one third of total employment 
(calculated from data in United Republic of Tanzania 2008). 
 
At the opposite end of the urban scale, there are also major questions about the nature 
of urban economies in large cities.  In a globalised world of liberalised trade, SSA urban 
productive enterprises are generally struggling to compete with other producers, often 
in Asia.  The diktats of comparative advantage have been highly damaging for urban 
Africa and far more positive for urban Asia. Many African towns have suffered de-
industrialisation in direct contrast to the rapid industrialisation witnessed in Asia over 
the past 30 years, and FDI in urban-based productive sectors generating local jobs, as 
opposed to services and consumption, has been limited (see; Potts 2013).11 In Asia, 
many countries have achieved their successes through shrewd state management of 
mixed economies, limiting the play of market forces when this was deemed to restrict 
long-term economic aims. There has been forceful state intervention in sectors 
strategically designated to develop in the national interest, even if this meant breaking 
the rules of comparative advantage and liberalised trade (Chang 2007). Often, the 
essential conditions of competitive global production were in place before neo-liberal 
ideologies ruled the roost. In any case, these ‘rules’ are harder to break for the generally 
smaller, poorer and economically weak SSA countries, which, under the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s and 1990s, were thoroughly restructured (back) 
towards primary production outside of the cities. These countries remain to be largely in 
thrall to donor advice where market-based economic ideology remains dominant, 
despite some changes after the western financial crisis of 2008.  Oil-rich nations, in 
particular, may have positive financial balances that lessen this influence. Chinese 
investments in Africa also lessen IFI dominance but do not focus on urban-based 
production and jobs that might compete with their own interests, but rather on natural 
resources, trade and infrastructure. Furthermore, it is much harder for poor SSA 
countries to play the WTO rules ‘games’ whereby economically powerful countries can 
create complex incentives for local production which do not obviously breach their 
‘comparative advantage’ as import tariffs would (Prestowitz 2012). 
 
Consumption in African urban areas is growing fast, however this is largely due to fast 
natural increase.  This creates economic opportunities, certainly, but population growth, 
per se, is not to be confused with national structural economic change.  And, on the 
basis of typical income levels, shifts in consumption patterns from those of the past 30 
years are essentially between poor groups (Potts 2013), who tend to allow themselves 
the occasional new consumption of items like soft drinks, cheap toiletries, and very 
                                                 
11 The following section draws on the conclusions to Potts 2013. 
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cheap clothes, rather than higher value ‘middle class’ products. However, one important 
additional item that the urban poor in Africa are now buying, and perceive to be a 
necessity is a mobile phone, often recycled (like clothes) from Europe.  In 2010, the 
McKinsey Global Institute reported on African economies in a very upbeat fashion. Yet 
the report’s analysis of production, jobs and income-generation is essentially about 
natural resource-based economic opportunities outside towns and cities, despite the 
assertion that the economic changes discussed are not just about natural resources. 
Much of the analysis, apart from some references to conflicts that have come to an end, 
focuses on urban-based consumption and presumed opportunities within this area for 
foreign investors. There is nothing about productive investment opportunities in 
manufacturing industry in SSA towns or even in other types of productive enterprise 
that would generate large numbers of jobs for semi-skilled workers. 
 
The contrast with the Asian experience over the past 20 years is extreme. A further brief 
excursion into comparative urban analysis is useful. Cambodia is a reasonable 
comparator for many SSA countries. In 2008 it had a population of 13.4 million and its 
urban system is quite comparable to that in many SSA countries. The capital, Phnom 
Penh, had a population of 1.2 million, whilst the next largest town had about 168,000 
inhabitants.  The urbanisation level is about 20 per cent. Yet in 2008 the country had 2.5 
million internal economic migrants out of a total labour force of 7 million (ILO 2010) and 
the garment industry, which started in 1994 (Source Asean 2010) and employed 350,000 
women, had increased its employment numbers by 18 per cent over the previous two 
years, whilst exporting products worth $2.8 billion (ILO 2008) rising to $3.47 billion by 
2011 (ILO et al. 2011).  In 2010, textiles, garments and shoes accounted for 95 per cent 
of exports, and garments for 16 per cent of the GDP (Source Asean 2010). From 1997 to 
2007 the country experienced an annual average GDP growth of 9.8 per cent and about 
100,000 new industrial jobs (including utilities, construction and mining) were created 
each year (World Bank 2009a). A final sobering statistic from Southeast Asia is that by 
2008 Vietnam exported more light manufacturing products than all of sub-Saharan 
Africa, including South Africa (World Economic Forum et al. 2011).  Rather obviously, 
any comparison with China’s urban economic change is even more sobering, and while 
it can be argued that such comparison is meaningless given that China’s population 
exceeds that of SSA, unfortunately in a globalised world economy it is impossible to 
ignore the implications of ‘the competition’. This is what constrains contemporary SSA 
urban economies and what has made urban livelihoods so vulnerable in the latter 
decades of the twentieth century, and has fed through into changed migration patterns. 
 
6: Conclusions 
 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that patterns of urbanisation and rural-urban 
migration in SSA have changed significantly over the past 30 years. In many countries 
recent census evidence shows that the rate of urbanisation has slowed. Vulnerable 
urban livelihoods are a major reason why urban-rural migration has increased, 
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countering – to varying degrees – migration into towns. There is, however, significant 
differentiation between countries, and generalisations about SSA’s urbanisation and 
migration have become increasingly misleading.  The following nine points summarise 
the main elements and conclusions of the paper: 
  
1.  In the 1980s, 1990s and into the 2000s, many agency compilations (e.g. UN Habitat 
and World Bank) of urban data for SSA were based on poor data.  This was in part due to 
a lack of census data. Projected data were often used and these have very often proved 
to be overestimates. In many cases the level of overestimation was very high. This 
created a ‘received wisdom’ about SSA urbanisation, both within the region and 
externally, that all SSA countries were urbanising rapidly and that the region was 
experiencing the world’s fastest rate of urbanisation.  In reality there has been 
increasing differentiation between countries, with many experiencing a marked 
reduction in urbanisation according to their most recent censuses.  A smaller group of 
countries fits the ‘received wisdom’. 
 
2.  The contribution of rural-urban migration to SSA urbanisation (in the sense of an 
increase in the share of national populations in urban centres) has for decades been 
much lower than is frequently assumed, and overall most urban population growth is 
fuelled by natural increase within towns and redefinition of previously rural populations 
as ‘urban’. This has very important implications.  A discourse centred on urbanisation 
driven by rapid in-migration from rural areas is often associated with the logical 
deduction that urban economies must be reasonably attractive.  Alternatively, if it is 
recognised that urban economies are highly informalised across much of SSA and 
contain much poverty, the deduction is that SSA migration patterns are a theoretical 
puzzle.  However, both these deductions fall away once it is understood that large flows 
of net in-migration are not the main drivers of population growth in most towns.  It then 
becomes possible to (a) focus more clearly on the problems of urban poverty and (b) 
recognise the need to disaggregate data and to identify and analyse the towns, which 
really are growing exceptionally fast. 
 
3.  In some countries, small urban centres, as defined in national censuses, contribute 
significantly to current ‘urbanisation’.  Some of this is due to redefinition of settlements.  
This may not involve much, if any, migration. It is important to try to account for this 
when undertaking analyses of urbanisation and migration.   
 
4.  Small settlements designated as urban in some African countries may lack urban 
economic characteristics. In other parts of the world many would not be designated 
urban. This raises questions about the implications of this sort of ‘urbanisation’ for 
rigorous analysis of the structural and economic meaning of urbanisation in such 
countries, particularly when comparing with the experience in Asia.  Data on 
employment and activity patterns in such settlements can help analysts to work out the 
extent to which this sort of ‘urbanisation from below’ means (or does not mean) 
structural transformation in national economies. 
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5. Designating populations as ‘urban’ in SSA countries purely on the basis of population 
density will often be misleading (cf. Kenya), for the reasons raised in point 4 above.   
Often these are mainly farming populations. Analyses of urbanisation and migration that 
do not recognise, or are unable to factor in, such designations may come to wrong 
conclusions. 
 
6.  In large towns and cities in SSA, formal investment in urban-based and urban-located 
productive enterprises at a large-scale, generating large numbers of new jobs, has been 
seriously constrained during the neo-liberal era of capitalism. Urban economies have 
informalised to such an extent that most residents derive their livelihoods from informal 
activities.  The distribution of incomes in most large cities is desperately unequal and 
has become more so.  Most urban people are poor and many are absolutely poor, being 
food insecure.  One result has been significant circular migration.  As a result of this, in-
migration flows have been counterbalanced to a varying, but often significant, extent by 
out-migration.  This has been reflected in overall reduced population growth in a large 
number of towns across SSA in recent decades. The key point for migration analysis is 
that mobility remains high, according to most data, and people continue to seek income 
opportunities, but the outcomes for national population geography have shifted in 
many countries, as urbanisation has slowed. 
 
7.  There is a vast range of research proving the significance of rural-urban linkages in 
contemporary SSA.  Millions of households have livelihoods that straddle rural and 
urban places and income opportunities.  Remittances and flows of goods and people 
between these households – both rural-urban and urban-rural – are crucial aspects of 
how SSA people ‘get by’.  This does not mean, however, that macro-economic and 
demographic assessments of migration and urbanisation in SSA which seek to compare 
the region’s structural urban economic experiences with other parts of the world, 
particularly Asia, do not require appreciation of the definitional issues about settlement 
type and employment and activity status listed above. They do – otherwise analyses 
may not be comparing like with like, and conclusions cannot be rigorous.  However, at 
the national and sub-national level, the blurring of the rural-urban divide for livelihoods 
is a reality and this also requires analysis and research. 
 
8.  The current era of rapid GDP growth in many SSA countries is likely to feed through 
into changes in migration patterns, as the geography of incomes and opportunities 
change in response.  Evidently, cities characterised by extremely informal labour 
markets have often continued to experience net in-migration.  As stated earlier, the 
analysis here should not be taken to suggest that this has ceased or reversed (except in 
rare circumstances) – the argument is all about scale and degree, i.e. that the numbers 
of net in-migrants have fallen, not that there are none.  However, the creation of more 
formal, regularly paid jobs suitable for the employment of low- and semi-skilled workers 
is bound to encourage not only more in-migration but also to facilitate longer stays in 
towns, or permanent residence if this is desired. It will also better support informal 
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sector workers, many of whom are in services and trade, sectors for which demands will 
be strengthened by the increases in the number of formal workers. The beginning of re-
urbanisation in Zambia, and Ghana’s rapid urbanisation over the past decade are 
markers of this. The upsurge in mining and oil and gas production/exploration 
throughout SSA, in response to high levels of demand from Asian economies, is bound 
to have (and already is having) urbanising effects.  However some mining activities have 
quite limited direct urbanising impacts.  The future of urban economies and rural-urban 
and urban-rural migration trends will therefore surely depend on the extent to which 
SSA governments are able and willing to translate the increased income from natural 
resource production into diversified and specialised urban-based formal employment 
opportunities.  The lack of comparative advantage in most of SSA, compared to Asia, in 
many such activities is a serious constraint, while the history of shocking inequality in 
incomes and in the spatial spread of the benefits of GDP generated in oil-rich countries 
like Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Congo does not, unfortunately, provide a 
positive precedent. 
 
9.  The strong long-term growth of towns in SSA like Kumasi and Arusha, which are not 
capital cities, is under-researched.  Their success is based largely on servicing productive 
hinterlands combined with having strong administrative functions. Seeking explanation 
in local rather than global economic spaces is unfashionable in urban studies today but, 
given the constraints on Africa’s global urban economic competitiveness, research on 
the local underpinnings of towns that demonstrate economic vitality is nonetheless 
important. 
30 
 
Figure 1:  Urban Population Growth Scenarios 
 
Figure 1.2: Urban Growth Scenarios
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Figure 2: SSA countries which have experienced periods of counter-
urbanisation 
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Figure 3: SSA countries which have experienced negligible urbanisation 
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Figure 4: SSA countries which have experienced recent rapid urbanisation 
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Figure 5: Comparison of changes in urbanisation levels in Asian and sub-
Saharan African countries (based on UN Habitat data downloaded September 
2012) 
 
Note: graph above depicts the percentage increase in urbanisation levels in large mainland SSA countries where there 
are also some census data available for cross-checking; countries such as Angola and DRC which have had no censuses 
for decades are excluded 
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